Sam Greene
Professor of Russian Politics, King's College London. Political sociologist. Progressive. Co-author, Putin v the People. 🇬🇧/🇺🇸
- Once more: The incoherence of the Trump administration should not be confused with incapacity. Trump inherited structures of incomparable global power and is unencumbered by calculations of consequence. This power may dissipate, but the costs in the interim will be immense.
- Reupping this article from February — because nothing has changed. Putin is still being allowed to fight at the table for what he can’t win on the ground. Trump is still pursuing normalisation at the expense of Ukraine. Europe is still prostrate. www.newstatesman.com/world/europe...
- Looking for a way to shore up a foundering autocratic regime? Try this: www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/u...
- Get better analysis of the Russian economy than Trump does. Tune into Sasha & Sasha at The Bell. pro.thebell.io/webinar_sept...
- The list of countries that have moved to outlaw Soros and the Open Society Foundations is long. Oddly enough, it does not include any democracies.
- Remember when the anti-immigrant MAGA base went to war against Elon and Vivek over visas? Looks like they found a compromise. on.ft.com/4nisPq2
- Hey New York! Come hang out on Thursday at @nyujordancenter.bsky.social! harriman.columbia.edu/event/10-yea...
- In this view of the world, there is no room for people endowed with free will and inalienable rights. There is only room for humanoid furniture, animatronics whose function is to soothe the aesthetic senses of those who believe that true power—even in a republic—is inherited.
- So, the party of limited government, strict constitutional originalism and free markets is now lining up for federal troops in cities, government-imposed censorship in education and state ownership of major corporations. Shocking, but not surprising, I suppose.
- For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1
- First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody. Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous. /2
- The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing. /3
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View full threadA genuinely productive negotiating process will be a complicated and protracted one. But if Trump doesn’t have the patience for that kind of process, or if Putin is able to maneuver him into impatience, Europe will have to push back. /END
- As we wait: the morning after the day before and before the day after tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-...
- Looking ahead to tomorrow’s US-Ukraine-Europe meeting in the White House, for @npr.org www.npr.org/2025/08/17/n...
- Most of us had assumed, I think, that the Anchorage summit ended early because the sides couldn’t agree on much. Turns out Putin just decided to quit while he was ahead. The ball is now in Europe’s court.
- Ok, so this tweet didn’t age well. The piece did, though: “Reversing this trajectory will require … a commitment to the near-term reduction of European dependence on US decision-making, while simultaneously building credible deterrence against Moscow.”
- As expected, Trump and Putin leave Anchorage adrift. As I wrote Thursday for @cepa.org, the question now is as it has long been: can Europe take charge? cepa.org/article/unmo...
- As expected, Trump and Putin leave Anchorage adrift. As I wrote Thursday for @cepa.org, the question now is as it has long been: can Europe take charge? cepa.org/article/unmo...
- Maybe — just maybe — we could accept that Labour have done the analysis and know what they’re doing?
- "The risk is not that Europe overreaches, but that it undershoots. Europe will never have all the resources it needs to assure itself of victory. Failing to go to diplomatic war with the army it has, however, assures it of defeat." My two cents ahead of Anchorage for @cepa.org
- Far be it for me to defend Badenoch, but did anybody consider that maybe she didn't want to meet Vance? What's the upside for her?
- After all these months, we've finally discovered something that JD Vance is right about. He believes that Kemi Badenoch is not worth meeting. And in this – and only this – he is entirely correct inews.co.uk/opinion/jd-v...
- A few thoughts on Putin’s very good week, for @paulsonne.bsky.social @nytimes.com www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/w...
- As things stand, Ukraine and Europe are on the verge of being confronted with exactly the kind of Faustian deal they feared would emerge back in February. The fact that Europe hasn’t moved to block such a deal in the past six months is a failure of leadership and diplomacy. /1
- Europe had a choice: it could fight for a seat at the US-Russia table and thereby create agency for itself and Ukraine, or it could create another table entirely. Europe has consistently chosen the former. Hence, here we are. /2
- Ukraine is thus caught between two fatal delusions. The first is America’s delusion that Russia will provide security for Ukraine. It can’t and won’t. The second is Europe’s delusion that its security must run through America. Not anymore. /3
- Security for Ukraine and Europe depends on the two coming together to insulate themselves from Washington and construct deterrence against Moscow. The talks that really matter, then, aren’t the ones in Alaska next week. They’re the ones in Europe, right now. /END
- Ugh. Personality traits are set in very early childhood and don’t change much over time. Asking people to become “more conscientious” in the way the science understands it is like asking me to stop being bald. Any attempt would be entirely artificial. on.ft.com/46Najk8
- But that’s just the first problem with this piece. The bigger issue is that surveys like this don’t actually measure shifts in latent personality traits. They measure shifts in how people understand themselves in the context of others — and that context is always shifting.
- Measuring *actual* personality traits requires laboratory or extended observational research. Surveys can approximate (as my own do), but they’re too a flimsy peg on which to hang an argument like this.
- In sum, this research does not show that rates of conscientiousness are falling. It shows that people are less likely to think of themselves as particularly conscientious in comparison to others. And that may matter, but not necessarily in the way this article suggests.
- So, this is making the rounds and really -- desparately -- needs to be clarified. The TL;DR is this: Polls don't measure shifts in opinion so much as shifts in context. news.gallup.com/poll/693203/... (A brief 🧵) /1
- On the face of it, this survey shows about 2/3 of Ukrainians saying they think Ukraine should negotiate an end to the war ASAP, with the remainder thinking it should fight on. Two years ago, the numbers were reversed. But that doesn't mean what the headline says it means. /2
- In 2023, Ukraine's summer offensive had failed, and Russia was again confident of victory. Moscow wasn't interested in a ceasefire The only negotiated settlement available was capitulation. In 2025, things are different -- and the data reflect that difference. /3
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View full threadThe real takeaway is this, then: Ukrainians are extremely sensitive to the context of this war, and their thoughts on how to end it appear to track what they take to be the most effective way of maintaining security and sovereignty. /END
