The Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
"Exploring Knowledge as a Social Phenomenon"
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social-epistemology.comOn Reasonable Cooperation and Vaccine Hesitancy Among Ethnically Marginalized Communities: A Reply to Kelsall and Sorell, Tarun Kattumana
In “Two Kinds of Vaccine Hesitancy”, Joshua Kelsall and Tom Sorell (2025) consider whether it is reasonable to be vaccine hesitant. The paper discusses a number…
On Reasonable Cooperation and Vaccine Hesitancy Among Ethnically Marginalized Communities: A Reply to Kelsall and Sorell, Tarun Kattumana
In “Two Kinds of Vaccine Hesitancy”, Joshua Kelsall and Tom Sorell (2025) consider whether it is reasonable to be vaccine hesitant. The paper discusses a number of key issues such as: (i) open questions about representativeness in vaccine trials; (ii) novel vaccines using the mRNA vaccine platform; (iii) questions raised by new variants of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (iv) distrust of institutions offering vaccines on account of discriminatory practices.
Will the Anti-Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Continuing Dialogue with Baumann, Benjamin W. McCraw
I want to extend an additional and deeper thanks to Peter Baumann for the continued dialogue stemming from my paper. Baumann’s charitable, yet critical, continued discussion models what is best in the…
Will the Anti-Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Continuing Dialogue with Baumann, Benjamin W. McCraw
I want to extend an additional and deeper thanks to Peter Baumann for the continued dialogue stemming from my paper. Baumann’s charitable, yet critical, continued discussion models what is best in the philosophical tradition. I hope my few thoughts in response can help continue it further. I will quickly mention and address a few points that strike me from Baumann’s response.
Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable “Bullshit Machines”? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities, Rico Hauswald
In a recent contribution to SERRC, Moti Mizrahi criticizes current attempts to make conceptual space for the idea of artificial epistemic authorities (AEAs), that is, large…
Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable “Bullshit Machines”? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities, Rico Hauswald
In a recent contribution to SERRC, Moti Mizrahi criticizes current attempts to make conceptual space for the idea of artificial epistemic authorities (AEAs), that is, large language models (LLMs) or other AI systems functioning as epistemic authorities (Mizrahi 2025). In particular, he takes issue with a recent article of mine (Hauswald 2025), in which I assess the arguments both for and against allowing the possibility of granting AI systems the status of AEAs.
SERRC Volume 15, Issue 12, 1–80, January 2026
Volume 15, Issue 1, 1–80, January 2026 ❧ Kukkonen, Karin. 2026. “A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to ‘Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (1): 1–6. ❧ Shajahan, Muhammed Shah.…
SERRC Volume 15, Issue 12, 1–80, January 2026
Volume 15, Issue 1, 1–80, January 2026 ❧ Kukkonen, Karin. 2026. “A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to ‘Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (1): 1–6. ❧ Shajahan, Muhammed Shah. 2026. “Thinking Dwelling with Heidegger and Asad: Existence, Authority, and the Problem of Home.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (1): 7–14.
Measures of Epistemic Autonomy: Remarks on Beebe’s Scales, Heather Battaly
James Beebe’s “The Pitfalls of Epistemic Autonomy without Intellectual Humility” (2024) asks whether intellectual humility can prevent epistemic autonomy from becoming an extreme form of intellectual individualism. More…
Measures of Epistemic Autonomy: Remarks on Beebe’s Scales, Heather Battaly
James Beebe’s “The Pitfalls of Epistemic Autonomy without Intellectual Humility” (2024) asks whether intellectual humility can prevent epistemic autonomy from becoming an extreme form of intellectual individualism. More specifically, Beebe is interested in whether intellectual humility moderates the predicted pitfalls of excessive epistemic autonomy, which include increased susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs and decreased trust in scientists. Using a series of three studies, his paper aims to test whether people who are epistemically autonomous, but not intellectually humble, are more likely to believe conspiracy theories and less likely to trust scientists than people who are both epistemically autonomous and intellectually humble.
Death as an Epistemological Foundation, Ilina Marinova
Debates over brain death and organ donation are often framed as technical or ethical disputes. This article argues that something more fundamental is at stake. It examines death as a functional epistemic category that modern societies rely on…
Death as an Epistemological Foundation, Ilina Marinova
Debates over brain death and organ donation are often framed as technical or ethical disputes. This article argues that something more fundamental is at stake. It examines death as a functional epistemic category that modern societies rely on to close accounts, order events in time, and terminate responsibility across institutions and individuals. By distinguishing between death as a boundary sufficient for learning and judgment, and death as a discrete, time-indexed zero-point required for large-scale coordination and planning, the article shows why contemporary controversies persist despite decades of definitional refinement.
Gnostic Populism or What I Learned on X, Bernard N. Wills
One of the most striking things about our contemporary culture (and its assumed ‘secularity) is the degree to which it recapitulates mythic and theological patterns long assumed lost and superseded. This is especially true in the political…
Gnostic Populism or What I Learned on X, Bernard N. Wills
One of the most striking things about our contemporary culture (and its assumed ‘secularity) is the degree to which it recapitulates mythic and theological patterns long assumed lost and superseded. This is especially true in the political realm where rival mythologies clash in the form of secular ideologies. One of these myths is the myth of universal emancipation. With Badiou we may credit St.
A “Parasitology” of Interdisciplinary Collaborations: Theorizing the Add-on Role of Social Sciences and Humanities, Judith Igelsböck
Abstract Anita Välikangas’s analysis of a broad selection of interdisciplinary funding programs shows that the Social Sciences and Humanities’ (SSH) relegation to…
A “Parasitology” of Interdisciplinary Collaborations: Theorizing the Add-on Role of Social Sciences and Humanities, Judith Igelsböck
Abstract Anita Välikangas’s analysis of a broad selection of interdisciplinary funding programs shows that the Social Sciences and Humanities’ (SSH) relegation to subordinate “add-on” roles with limited opportunities for epistemically oriented research in interdisciplinary projects, is already prefigured by funding structures. Beyond holding significant implications for research policy, this finding necessitates a critical reflection on the positionality of the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) within STEM-dominated interdisciplinary collaborations.
Understanding, Teaching, and Phenomenology in the Age of LLMs: Critical Reply to Malfatti’s “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding”, Jacob Rump
In “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding” (2025), Federica Isabella Malfatti provides a thought-provoking account of what it would take for an Large…
Understanding, Teaching, and Phenomenology in the Age of LLMs: Critical Reply to Malfatti’s “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding”, Jacob Rump
In “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding” (2025), Federica Isabella Malfatti provides a thought-provoking account of what it would take for an Large Language Model (LLM) such as ChatGPT to count as a good teacher, insofar as teachers are fosterers of understanding, not just knowledge.[1] The essay is a welcome extension of the current focus on understanding in epistemology to technology contexts, and especially timely given the current concerning state of AI use in education.
What Are We to Do About Vicious Distrusters? A Reply to Carter and Meehan, Johnny Brennan
The pursuit of knowledge can go wrong in many ways. It can go wrong when trying to gain knowledge through reasoning. We jump to conclusions, ignore disconfirming evidence, improperly interpret evidence,…
What Are We to Do About Vicious Distrusters? A Reply to Carter and Meehan, Johnny Brennan
The pursuit of knowledge can go wrong in many ways. It can go wrong when trying to gain knowledge through reasoning. We jump to conclusions, ignore disconfirming evidence, improperly interpret evidence, assume the very thing we are trying to prove, favor what is salient or most recent in our memory rather than what is representative. Call these errors of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge can also go wrong when trying to identify who the trustworthy testifiers are who can impart knowledge to us.
Interstitial Justice and Erasure: A Response to Richardson, Ásta
A lot of philosophical work in the last two decades has been at the intersection of theoretical and practical philosophy, especially concerning social aspects of epistemic, linguistic, or ontological phenomena. Although the…
Interstitial Justice and Erasure: A Response to Richardson, Ásta
A lot of philosophical work in the last two decades has been at the intersection of theoretical and practical philosophy, especially concerning social aspects of epistemic, linguistic, or ontological phenomena. Although the literature on epistemic and discursive injustice is now quite extensive, it is only recently that philosophers have started to theorize forms of injustice that can be called “metaphysical”. These include phenomena such as ontic injustice (Jenkins 2023), ontic oppression (Dembroff 2018; 2020), ontic exclusion and erasure (Richardson 2023), and categorical and interstitial injustice (Ásta 2019; 2024).
Restricting AI to Its Proper Sphere: A Response to Blok, Jonas Hallström
In his fine and philosophically well-argued article “Economics and Politics in the Age of AI” (2025), Vincent Blok asserts that the “technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the…
Restricting AI to Its Proper Sphere: A Response to Blok, Jonas Hallström
In his fine and philosophically well-argued article “Economics and Politics in the Age of AI” (2025), Vincent Blok asserts that the “technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the instrumentalization and datafication of human life” and subsequently that specifically artificial intelligence (AI) leads to “instrumentalization, commodification and datafication of all domains of human life” (1–2). In Blok’s view, it is the notion of an…
Thinking Dwelling with Heidegger and Asad: Existence, Authority, and the Problem of Home, Muhammed Shah Shajahan
Muhammed Nishad’s reflections on Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling (wohnen) to interpret the social and political significance of Mosques in the South Indian region of Malabar open…
Thinking Dwelling with Heidegger and Asad: Existence, Authority, and the Problem of Home, Muhammed Shah Shajahan
Muhammed Nishad’s reflections on Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling (wohnen) to interpret the social and political significance of Mosques in the South Indian region of Malabar open an occasion to think about existence and tradition more broadly and in an interconnected manner.[1] As I am neither an expert on Heidegger, nor do I claim a ground in the political and philosophical stakes of engaging him,
A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to “Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue”, Karin Kukkonen,
My proposal in the initial article (2024) was that literary texts and the expertise of literary scholars have an important role to play in developing new means for exchange and…
A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to “Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue”, Karin Kukkonen,
My proposal in the initial article (2024) was that literary texts and the expertise of literary scholars have an important role to play in developing new means for exchange and dialogue across disciplines. Put into practice in the salon format, the literary texts that all participants have read support the discussion by providing epistemic common ground and by maintaining the flexibility of a “boundary object” that allows for multiple interpretations, while the expertise of literary scholars in picking up on formal features of the literary texts themselves, serves to structure the metacognitive dimension of the discussion.
SERRC: Of Note, 2025
My sincerest thanks to the SERRC’s contributors in 2025. Your work cultivated the reception of select articles published in Social Epistemology and Techné and produced insights about ongoing dialogues and projects. I am particularly grateful for the continuing engagement of…
SERRC: Of Note, 2025
My sincerest thanks to the SERRC’s contributors in 2025. Your work cultivated the reception of select articles published in Social Epistemology and Techné and produced insights about ongoing dialogues and projects. I am particularly grateful for the continuing engagement of all our contributors and our readers. … . Highlighted Resources: ❦ SERRC: Of Note, 2024. ❦ SERRC: Of Note, 2023…
SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025
Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025 ❧ Basham, Lee. 2025. “Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 1–10. ❧ Tuckwell, William. 2025. “A Comment on Anderson’s ‘Virtuous…
SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025
Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025 ❧ Basham, Lee. 2025. “Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 1–10. ❧ Tuckwell, William. 2025. “A Comment on Anderson’s ‘Virtuous Virtue Signaling, Morally Good Grandstanding’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 11–15. ❧ Yang, Yang. 2025. “Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism in the Context of AI and Knowledge Governance in China and the West: An Interview with Steve Fuller.”
Epistemic Agency Is Enhancing Your Power to Know: A Reply to Coeckelbergh, Gärtner, Steup and Xu, Adam Riggio
A massively important concern for our time, at the moment, is the question of epistemic agency, how we can develop it, and how we can protect it from pernicious forces and influences that…
Epistemic Agency Is Enhancing Your Power to Know: A Reply to Coeckelbergh, Gärtner, Steup and Xu, Adam Riggio
A massively important concern for our time, at the moment, is the question of epistemic agency, how we can develop it, and how we can protect it from pernicious forces and influences that would undermine it. So, I welcome the debate here unfolding around Mark Coeckelbergh’s article in Social Epistemology, “AI and Epistemic Agency” (2025). The contributions that have appeared so far have made important points.
Twenty Years After Kitzmiller: Towards a Different Science-Religion Relationship, Steve Fuller
On 20 December 2005, Judge John Jones decided in favour of the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller et al v Dover Area School District at the Mid-Pennsylvania US District Court in Harrisburg. I testified as an…
Twenty Years After Kitzmiller: Towards a Different Science-Religion Relationship, Steve Fuller
On 20 December 2005, Judge John Jones decided in favour of the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller et al v Dover Area School District at the Mid-Pennsylvania US District Court in Harrisburg. I testified as an expert witness for the defence during the trial, which received worldwide attention. Indeed, by the time I returned to the UK after my court appearance, a report had appeared on page three of the…
Why Should We Read Old Books in the Time of LLMs? (And, No, Not Because Using LLMs is Cheating), Ljiljana Radenovic
Recently on X (formerly Twitter), an account that promotes various uses of LLMs (Large Language Models) to their academic followers posted a thread on how to write 4,000 words of…
Why Should We Read Old Books in the Time of LLMs? (And, No, Not Because Using LLMs is Cheating), Ljiljana Radenovic
Recently on X (formerly Twitter), an account that promotes various uses of LLMs (Large Language Models) to their academic followers posted a thread on how to write 4,000 words of one’s PhD thesis in one day. The instructions were fairly detailed. Unfortunately, this particular thread is now gone, but other threads are still available, so let us briefly take a look at a similar one (on the use of Discourse Graphs) to get a sense of the kind of advice this account offers ...
“Hope Does Not Put Us to Shame”: A Final Anti-Skeptical Reply to Tőzsér, Bálint Békefi
In my review (2024) of János Tőzsér’s monograph The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (2023), I developed three main lines of criticism, which I then defended (2025) against his response (2025a). In his latest…
“Hope Does Not Put Us to Shame”: A Final Anti-Skeptical Reply to Tőzsér, Bálint Békefi
In my review (2024) of János Tőzsér’s monograph The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (2023), I developed three main lines of criticism, which I then defended (2025) against his response (2025a). In his latest reply, Tőzsér (2025b) zeroes in on my first criticism, which concerns “the book’s lack of discussion of important supporting arguments behind positions it rejects” (59), and seeks to address my “main objections to argument in favor of skepticism and the general anti-skeptical vision that emerges from them” (29).
Four Questions about Expertise and Epistemic Authority, Jonghyeon Kim and Nathan Ballantyne
Intuitively, it is rational for laypeople to defer to experts’ testimony, even when the laypeople’s prior beliefs are in tension with expert opinion. After all, experts are, by definition, a more reliable…
Four Questions about Expertise and Epistemic Authority, Jonghyeon Kim and Nathan Ballantyne
Intuitively, it is rational for laypeople to defer to experts’ testimony, even when the laypeople’s prior beliefs are in tension with expert opinion. After all, experts are, by definition, a more reliable source of beliefs about their areas of expertise than laypeople. And so, in order to benefit from a particular expert’s epistemic superiority, a layperson has good reason to regard that expert as an epistemic authority.
Philosophy for Daleks: Nick Bostrom’s Shallow Utopia, Dylan Evans
I’ve studied now Philosophy And Jurisprudence, Medicine,— And even, alas! Theology,— From end to end, with labor keen; And here, poor fool! with all my lore I stand, no wiser than before. — Goethe, Faust Part I If Nick Bostrom’s…
Philosophy for Daleks: Nick Bostrom’s Shallow Utopia, Dylan Evans
I’ve studied now Philosophy And Jurisprudence, Medicine,— And even, alas! Theology,— From end to end, with labor keen; And here, poor fool! with all my lore I stand, no wiser than before. — Goethe, Faust Part I If Nick Bostrom’s best-known book, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (2014), was a science fiction version of Dante’s Inferno, his most recent offering,
Yes, Save the Children from Fake AI “Friends”, Jeremy Weissman
It is common to equate technological innovation with socio-political progress. In many ways this is not an unreasonable reaction. Afterall, what moves forward the course of history and our socio-political arrangements more than changes…
Yes, Save the Children from Fake AI “Friends”, Jeremy Weissman
It is common to equate technological innovation with socio-political progress. In many ways this is not an unreasonable reaction. Afterall, what moves forward the course of history and our socio-political arrangements more than changes to technology and our material condition? Indeed, social conservativism, and its holding to past tradition, has at times resulted in prohibiting new technologies, such as birth control, that threaten to upend such traditions.
Calculated Belief: On Bayesian Reason and the Ethics of Judgment, Boecyàn Bourgade
We live in a world overflowing with predictions; from recommendation algorithms to risk scores that tell judges, doctors, and even dating apps what to expect next. Behind many of these systems sits a quiet…
Calculated Belief: On Bayesian Reason and the Ethics of Judgment, Boecyàn Bourgade
We live in a world overflowing with predictions; from recommendation algorithms to risk scores that tell judges, doctors, and even dating apps what to expect next. Behind many of these systems sits a quiet mathematical idea: Bayesian reasoning. But what happens when this “calculus of belief” becomes the structure of everyday judgment? … . Article Citation: Bourgade, Boecyàn. 2025. “Calculated Belief: On Bayesian Reason and the Ethics of Judgment.” …
Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism in the Context of AI and Knowledge Governance in China and the West: An Interview with Steve Fuller, Yang Yang
This interview with Professor Steve Fuller continues a dialogue that began in two earlier conversations—"Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism? An…
Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism in the Context of AI and Knowledge Governance in China and the West: An Interview with Steve Fuller, Yang Yang
This interview with Professor Steve Fuller continues a dialogue that began in two earlier conversations—"Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism? An Interview with Michael A. Peters” and “Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism? An Interview with Steve Fuller.” These exchanges sought to explore the theoretical tension and potential convergence between knowledge socialism and knowledge capitalism, two paradigms that frame contemporary debates on the political economy of knowledge.
A Comment on Anderson’s “Virtuous Virtue Signaling, Morally Good Grandstanding”, William Tuckwell
To virtue signal is to say or do things in order to enhance or preserve one’s moral reputation (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 14–23).[1] Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke (2016; 2020) argue that because of its…
A Comment on Anderson’s “Virtuous Virtue Signaling, Morally Good Grandstanding”, William Tuckwell
To virtue signal is to say or do things in order to enhance or preserve one’s moral reputation (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 14–23).[1] Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke (2016; 2020) argue that because of its bad consequences, there is a strong moral presumption against virtue signalling. In Tuckwell (2024). I noted that virtue signalling can also have significant good consequences.
Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority, Lee Basham
“Show Me”—a slogan commonly associated with the state of Missouri, US. There is a third perspective on conspiracy theory and epistemic authority that might be helpful in any discussion of epistemic authority.[1] One skeptical of…
Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority, Lee Basham
“Show Me”—a slogan commonly associated with the state of Missouri, US. There is a third perspective on conspiracy theory and epistemic authority that might be helpful in any discussion of epistemic authority.[1] One skeptical of “epistemic authority” as pivotal in politics and particularly, any discussion of conspiracy and its theory. The very notion of epistemic authority in affairs of society is not just alien to democracy as foundational, it is so easily abused it is dangerous, as dangerous as any theocracy or other…
I can discuss many reasons for why we founded and developed the SERRC, but here's a handy one for current times: "Major AI conference flooded with peer reviews written fully by AI"
www.nature.com/articles/d41...
Major AI conference flooded with peer reviews written fully by AI
Controversy has erupted after 21% of manuscript reviews for an international AI conference were found to be generated by artificial intelligence.
SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 11, 1–81, November 2025
Volume 14, Issue 11, 1–81, November 2025 ❧ Koopman, Colin. 2025. “Associationist Philosophy of Technology and Liberal Political Philosophy.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (11) 1–10. ❧ Gärtner, Klaus. 2025. “AI and Epistemic…
SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 11, 1–81, November 2025
Volume 14, Issue 11, 1–81, November 2025 ❧ Koopman, Colin. 2025. “Associationist Philosophy of Technology and Liberal Political Philosophy.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (11) 1–10. ❧ Gärtner, Klaus. 2025. “AI and Epistemic Agency: Responding to Coeckelbergh.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (11): 11–16. ❧ Baumann, Peter. 2025. “Will the Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Further Reply to McCraw.”
From Grok to Grokipedia: Sociological Propaganda and Chatbot Epistemology, Eric D. Berg
Abstract Susan Schneider’s article (2025) on the epistemology of Chatbots is the start to a much larger conversation scholars and educators need to have about the influence these technologies have on knowledge…
From Grok to Grokipedia: Sociological Propaganda and Chatbot Epistemology, Eric D. Berg
Abstract Susan Schneider’s article (2025) on the epistemology of Chatbots is the start to a much larger conversation scholars and educators need to have about the influence these technologies have on knowledge and knowledge production. To that end, I wish to expand this conversation to an aspect briefly mentioned in her paper; the use of these technologies by bad actors and propagandists to shape the worldview of users.
Slicing the Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate too Thin: A Review of Lyons’s Scientific Realism, Moti Mizrahi
Timothy Lyons's Scientific Realism (2025) is a book in the Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Science series. Like all books in this series, its purported aim is to provide an…
Slicing the Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate too Thin: A Review of Lyons’s Scientific Realism, Moti Mizrahi
Timothy Lyons's Scientific Realism (2025) is a book in the Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Science series. Like all books in this series, its purported aim is to provide an extensive overview of a topic or debate in philosophy of science. In the case of Lyons, the debate is the scientific realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science, which is philosophically rich with various positions and arguments (Chakravartty 2017).
Knowledge from AI, Orestis Palermos
Abstract I examine whether Generative AI systems such as ChatGPT can transmit knowledge and, if so, how epistemic responsibility for their outputs should be distributed. To address these issues, the discussion proceeds in three stages. First, I situate John…
Knowledge from AI, Orestis Palermos
Abstract I examine whether Generative AI systems such as ChatGPT can transmit knowledge and, if so, how epistemic responsibility for their outputs should be distributed. To address these issues, the discussion proceeds in three stages. First, I situate John Greco’s notion of massively shared agency within the recent literature on AI testimony, showing how it challenges the widespread assumption that AI cannot testify due to its lack of intentions.
The Logician’s Responsibility: A Response to Caret, Franci Mangraviti
While generally being on board with my arguments for the existence of logic-based epistemic injustice, Colin Caret (2025) argues that “logic teaching is the epicenter of these problems”, and doubts “whether the typical approach…
The Logician’s Responsibility: A Response to Caret, Franci Mangraviti
While generally being on board with my arguments for the existence of logic-based epistemic injustice, Colin Caret (2025) argues that “logic teaching is the epicenter of these problems”, and doubts “whether the typical approach to logic teaching significantly stifles the flexibility that is needed to understand and reflect on logically revisionary, emancipatory strategies’’ (31). While I think Caret is correct in pointing out that the problem doesn’t necessarily…
Amateur Expertise and Post-Fordist Learning: A Response to Lassiter, Francesco Censon
I am grateful to Charles Lassiter (2025) for his commentary on my article “The Rejected Expert and the Knowledge’s Half-Blood” (Censon 2025), and I am also extremely pleased to see that he accepts several points…
Amateur Expertise and Post-Fordist Learning: A Response to Lassiter, Francesco Censon
I am grateful to Charles Lassiter (2025) for his commentary on my article “The Rejected Expert and the Knowledge’s Half-Blood” (Censon 2025), and I am also extremely pleased to see that he accepts several points of my argument. Previously, I had seen in his paper “Reading the Signs: From Dyadic to Triadic Views for Identifying Experts” (2024) a confirmation of my thesis on the crisis of expert recognition.
Responding to Aguisoul’s “Hinge Epistemology: No Choice but Choose?”, Jordi Fairhurst Chilton
I want to start this reply by thanking Youssef Aguisoul (2025) for such a clear and engaging reply to my paper. I am honoured that my work is discussed in such detail, allowing me to be a part of a…
Responding to Aguisoul’s “Hinge Epistemology: No Choice but Choose?”, Jordi Fairhurst Chilton
I want to start this reply by thanking Youssef Aguisoul (2025) for such a clear and engaging reply to my paper. I am honoured that my work is discussed in such detail, allowing me to be a part of a much-needed conversation about the meta-philosophy of hinge epistemology. In what follows, I will do my best to recap the current discussion and attempt to answer some of the concerns raised by Aguisoul.
Extending How We Think Through Technology: A Review of Miller, Jerómino, and Zhu’s Thinking Through Science and Technology, Yuqi Peng
In a world increasingly defined by rapid scientific advances, pervasive technologies, and engineered systems that mediate nearly every aspect of human life, we face…
Extending How We Think Through Technology: A Review of Miller, Jerómino, and Zhu’s Thinking Through Science and Technology, Yuqi Peng
In a world increasingly defined by rapid scientific advances, pervasive technologies, and engineered systems that mediate nearly every aspect of human life, we face an urgent need to critically engage with science and technology. From artificial intelligence and climate engineering to biomedical innovation and surveillance infrastructures, the challenges of our time are deeply intertwined with scientific and technological developments. These developments do not arise in a value–neutral vacuum; human choices, institutional power, and cultural assumptions shape them at every stage.
Epistemic Principles and Dialectical Neglect: A Response to Aikin and Emery, Dalila Serebrinsky
In “Deep Disagreement, Gradability, and Dialectical Neglect: Comments on Serebrinsky” (2025), Scott Aikin and Alison Emery analyze and respond to my “How Deep is your Disagreement” (2025). They offer a…
Epistemic Principles and Dialectical Neglect: A Response to Aikin and Emery, Dalila Serebrinsky
In “Deep Disagreement, Gradability, and Dialectical Neglect: Comments on Serebrinsky” (2025), Scott Aikin and Alison Emery analyze and respond to my “How Deep is your Disagreement” (2025). They offer a precise reading and make very good points. I agree with Aikin and Emery on many of those points and have nothing substantial to say about them. Nonetheless, I feel the need to address one of their objections: that my view on deep disagreement could lead to the acceptability of dialectical neglect.
Will the Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Further Reply to McCraw, Peter Baumann
I would like to thank Benjamin McCraw for his very thoughtful response (see McCraw 2025b) to my reply (see Baumann 2025) to his original article “A Reidian Transcendental Argument against Skepticism” (see McCraw 2025a). I can…
Will the Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Further Reply to McCraw, Peter Baumann
I would like to thank Benjamin McCraw for his very thoughtful response (see McCraw 2025b) to my reply (see Baumann 2025) to his original article “A Reidian Transcendental Argument against Skepticism” (see McCraw 2025a). I can see what speaks in favor of his view. I don’t have much to add to the two main points I made in my initial reply (first, that there might be a second-order escape route for the skeptic and, second, that one might have reasons to doubt McCraw’s justification of trusting others).
AI and Epistemic Agency: Responding to Coeckelbergh, Klaus Gärtner
I worked recently with colleagues to develop a new lens, the Mind-Technology Problem (MTP),[1] to look at what a mind could be. We argue that in light of smart technology and Generative AI (GenAI), we need to re-think what minds…
AI and Epistemic Agency: Responding to Coeckelbergh, Klaus Gärtner
I worked recently with colleagues to develop a new lens, the Mind-Technology Problem (MTP),[1] to look at what a mind could be. We argue that in light of smart technology and Generative AI (GenAI), we need to re-think what minds are. The MTP appears potentially capable of changing our biased perspectives regarding mind. I hasten to add that we developed the MTP as a successor framework, not a replacement, of the Mind-Body Problem (MBP).
Associationist Philosophy of Technology and Liberal Political Philosophy, Colin Koopman
Over the past decade, I have been reading Davide Panagia’s contributions to the political theory of technology and finding his work a profound instigator to thinking. I am grateful for this opportunity to…
Associationist Philosophy of Technology and Liberal Political Philosophy, Colin Koopman
Over the past decade, I have been reading Davide Panagia’s contributions to the political theory of technology and finding his work a profound instigator to thinking. I am grateful for this opportunity to further engage his insights concerning the politics of data technology as well as his criticisms of perceived limitations of my views on the same. A large part of why I continue to learn so much from Panagia’s work is that we simultaneously agree on many of the most important questions concerning the political philosophy of technology whilst nevertheless maintaining a small but significant set of crucial points of disagreement.
SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 10, 1–127, October 2025
Volume 14, Issue 10, 1–127, October 2025 ❧ McCraw, Benjamin W. 2025. “No Escape Route to the Radical Skeptic: A Reply to Baumann.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (10): 1–7. ❧ Radenovic, Ljiljana. 2025. “Knut Hamsun’s Pan: Cosmic…
SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 10, 1–127, October 2025
Volume 14, Issue 10, 1–127, October 2025 ❧ McCraw, Benjamin W. 2025. “No Escape Route to the Radical Skeptic: A Reply to Baumann.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (10): 1–7. ❧ Radenovic, Ljiljana. 2025. “Knut Hamsun’s Pan: Cosmic Connections from Within.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (10): 8–13. ❧ Erdt, Agnieszka. 2025. “Islamization of Philosophy? Why Ṣadrā Won’t Do the Work.”
Frogs or Sleepwalkers? Sycophants or Props? A Reply to Schneider on Chatbot Epistemology, Steven Gubka
Susan Schneider (2025) argues that AI chatbots pose a threat to human autonomy that is difficult for users to detect. Like the proverbial frog in the pot of water that is slowly heating to a…
Frogs or Sleepwalkers? Sycophants or Props? A Reply to Schneider on Chatbot Epistemology, Steven Gubka
Susan Schneider (2025) argues that AI chatbots pose a threat to human autonomy that is difficult for users to detect. Like the proverbial frog in the pot of water that is slowly heating to a deadly boil, we are unaware of the developing threat to our autonomy. Schneider characterizes this threat to our autonomy both in terms of knowledge (such as cases where a chatbot provides its users with unreliable information) and freedom from manipulation (such as cases where a chatbot incentivizes its users to act against their interests).
“That’s Philosophically Irrelevant” and Other Things the Philosophy Border Police Says: A Reply to Politi, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract It is difficult to engage in a constructive dialogue with philosophers who dismiss their fellow philosophers’ work as “philosophically irrelevant.” In Mizrahi (2025a), I…
“That’s Philosophically Irrelevant” and Other Things the Philosophy Border Police Says: A Reply to Politi, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract It is difficult to engage in a constructive dialogue with philosophers who dismiss their fellow philosophers’ work as “philosophically irrelevant.” In Mizrahi (2025a), I conducted a mixed-method study of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1996). The qualitative and quantitative evidence detailed in Mizrahi (2025a) suggest that Kuhn (1962/1996) perpetuates “Great Man” of science historiography. “Great Man” of science historiography paints a picture of the history of science as the biography of “great men.” For Politi (2025, 8), however, quantitative evidence is not “philosophically relevant.” He…
Evidence Resistance and the Political Utility of Conspiracy Theories, Keith Raymond Harris
Conspiracy theories have a prominent role in politics, but what is that role and why are conspiracy theories deployed to play it? M. Giulia Napolitano’s (2025) “Conspiracy Theories, Resistance to Evidence,…
Evidence Resistance and the Political Utility of Conspiracy Theories, Keith Raymond Harris
Conspiracy theories have a prominent role in politics, but what is that role and why are conspiracy theories deployed to play it? M. Giulia Napolitano’s (2025) “Conspiracy Theories, Resistance to Evidence, and Propaganda: How Conspiracy Theories Advance Political Causes” discusses the source and extent of the political utility of conspiracy theories. Although I agree with much of the substance of Napolitano’s argument, there are a few points where I’d like to push back or expand on Napolitano’s analysis.
Epistemic Hubris, Intellectual Virtues, and the Concept of Expertise, David Lanius
Recently, Francesca Pongiglione (2025, 92) introduced the concept of epistemic hubris as an epistemic flaw that is behind “the anonymous layperson who believes that a couple of afternoons doing online research…
Epistemic Hubris, Intellectual Virtues, and the Concept of Expertise, David Lanius
Recently, Francesca Pongiglione (2025, 92) introduced the concept of epistemic hubris as an epistemic flaw that is behind “the anonymous layperson who believes that a couple of afternoons doing online research suffice for gaining expertise even on complex topics.” She claims that it underlies the increasingly frequent phenomenon of “improvised expertise,” where nonexperts publicly claim epistemic authority on complex issues such as vaccines, climate change, or geopolitics.
Taking Up Carl Mitcham’s Review of Post-Europe, Yuk Hui
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Carl Mitcham for his kind review of Post-Europe (2024), a book which is at the same time intimate to me and polemic to the current political situation. It is a small book which accompanies a much…
Taking Up Carl Mitcham’s Review of Post-Europe, Yuk Hui
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Carl Mitcham for his kind review of Post-Europe (2024), a book which is at the same time intimate to me and polemic to the current political situation. It is a small book which accompanies a much bigger book (368 pages) titled Machine and Sovereignty: For a Planetary Thinking (2024), one that is much harder (and certainly takes longer) to read because it partly details my interpretation of the history of modern political philosophy from Hobbes to Schmitt, and partly elaborating on an agenda based on my work in the past decade.
Must Ontology be the Sole Defining Mark of a Philosophical Tradition? Addressing Ogbonnaya’s Arguments, Chinedu S. Ifeakor
African philosophy is no longer debated in terms of its existence, yet it still engages with several metaphilosophical questions. These questions include: What is African…
Must Ontology be the Sole Defining Mark of a Philosophical Tradition? Addressing Ogbonnaya’s Arguments, Chinedu S. Ifeakor
African philosophy is no longer debated in terms of its existence, yet it still engages with several metaphilosophical questions. These questions include: What is African philosophy? What are the appropriate trends within African philosophy? Which school of thought should be considered the most suitable for African philosophy? In which language should authentic African philosophy be articulated? What is criterion of African philosophy?
Smart Moral Technologies and Anti-Intellectualism about Abilities, Michał Klincewicz
Gloria Andrada and Adam J. Carter—"Mind-Technology Problems for Know-How Anti-Intellectualism," 2025—use the Mind-Technology problem (MTP) framework (Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito 2021) as a basis for theorizing…
Smart Moral Technologies and Anti-Intellectualism about Abilities, Michał Klincewicz
Gloria Andrada and Adam J. Carter—"Mind-Technology Problems for Know-How Anti-Intellectualism," 2025—use the Mind-Technology problem (MTP) framework (Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito 2021) as a basis for theorizing about skills and know-how. More specifically, they focus on anti-intellectualism about know-how, so the view that S knows how to do X in virtue of S having the ability to intentionally X. Anti-intellectualism is contrasted with intellectualism about know-how, so the view that S knows how to do X in virtue of knowing that something is the case or knowing some fact (Stanley and Williamson 2011; Bengson and Moffett 2007).
Against “Sky Pilot Epistemology”: Suicide, Self-Harm, and the Normative Architecture of Judaism—A Response to Basham, Mark D. West
Lee Basham’s essay—“Sky Pilot Epistemology: Heaven’s Gate and Masada” (2025)— proposes that the self-destructions at Masada and of the Heaven’s Gate community may be…
Against “Sky Pilot Epistemology”: Suicide, Self-Harm, and the Normative Architecture of Judaism—A Response to Basham, Mark D. West
Lee Basham’s essay—“Sky Pilot Epistemology: Heaven’s Gate and Masada” (2025)— proposes that the self-destructions at Masada and of the Heaven’s Gate community may be judged “epistemically sound” insofar as, from within those communities’ shared background assumptions, their decisions were rational. One may grant, arguendo, that agents sometimes act with a kind of internal coherence without thereby conceding the question that matters in a halakhic frame: whether the actions in question are permitted by Torah as interpreted through the rabbinic jurisprudence that constitutes Judaism’s normative order.
The Right Hinge for the Right Door: A Response to Fairhurst’s Piecemeal Hinge Epistemology, Anna Pederneschi
It is particularly hard to write a critical response to an argument one overall agrees with. In “Hinge Epistemology: Why Choose?” (2025) Jordi Fairhurst shows his readers that hinge…
The Right Hinge for the Right Door: A Response to Fairhurst’s Piecemeal Hinge Epistemology, Anna Pederneschi
It is particularly hard to write a critical response to an argument one overall agrees with. In “Hinge Epistemology: Why Choose?” (2025) Jordi Fairhurst shows his readers that hinge epistemology—a theory that holds that epistemic practices are based on unquestioned presuppositions called hinges—is stuck in a stalemate that prevents advancements. This paralysis, Fairhurst argues, is caused by a couple of assumption: a theoretical one that takes the presuppositions—hinges—to have some essentially common catachrestic and a methodological one that insists on building a global unified theory of hinges.
