April 13, 2024. Iran launches hundreds of drones and missiles against Israel. Almost none hits. No one is killed. No critical infrastructure is destroyed. It was not a failure. As I argue, this is performative aggression, a game of bumper cars in a world long defined by games of chicken.
In chicken, both players understand they are at risk, and the winner is the player with the superior risk appetite. There is high potential gain—prestige, intra-war deterrence, escalation dominance, control of the conflict tempo—but high downside (like runaway escalation).
In bumper cars, neither player expects any significant damage, and thus at least one may be inclined to test limits. Bumper cars has lower potential gain—symbolic wins, face-saving off-ramps—but lower downside (like less risk of provocation, assuming defenses hold).
This new kind of conflict—limited-damage strikes that capitalize on defender’s air defenses—presents challenges to traditional U.S. strategies of deterrence. Fighting performatively is a unique dilemma, with implications for the kinds of responses policymakers deem proportionate to the provocation.
The task ahead is therefore not only to prevent damage from drone and missile attacks, but to deny adversaries the ability to weaponize restraint itself in the aftermath of performative aggression.
Nov 24, 2025 17:12
