Juan Diego Bogotá
Phenomenologist and philosopher of cognitive science / Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Jyväskylä
/ Working on the differentiation and boundaries between self and other
- Here is a fun one. After working on and off on this for a couple of years, it is finally out. Have you wondered what a phenomenological analysis of imagination would look like if Husserl had played D&D? Well... here is the answer! link.springer.com/article/10.1...
- Here, we argue that D&D is a prime example of what we call 'co-constitutive imagination': cases where imagined phenomena emerge intersubjectively through ongoing reciprocal engagement, and where imaginative acts actively shape and are shaped by what is jointly imagined by a group of people.
- Essentially, we provide an overview of social approaches to imagination within phenomenology and, by analysing D&D, we argue that there is room for a more socially robust conception where what is imagined is continuously co-constituted by multiple people and irreducible to an individual's act.
- I have a new paper out! Most research on collective memory focuses on either its sociological or its psychological aspects. I complement those approaches with a phenomenological analysis of how collective remembering is experienced from the first-person perspective. link.springer.com/article/10.1...
- I introduce a phenomenological distinction between egoic and non-egoic collective memories: collective memories of past events we lived through and can remember episodically, and collective memories of distant past events we didn't live through.
- Building on phenomenological analyses of embodiment, episodic memory, and the intersubjective dimensions of perception, as well as on narrative approaches to social identity, and aspects of Bourdieu's practice theory, I analyse those two forms of collective memory.
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View full threadConcerning non-egoic collective memory, I focus on how what we encounter in the social world may scaffold (narratively and normatively) how we explicitly remember the distant past, as well as how the shared past of a group can structure an implicit body memory that shapes our bodily selfhood.
- Reposted by Juan Diego Bogotá
- I just got an email notifying me that a paper I published 2 years ago has finally been published in an actual issue of Phenomenology of the Cognitive Sciences. So now, a paper I wrote years ago and was "Bogotá (2023)" is now technically my latest publication. I don't know how to feel about all this
- In case anybody is curious... link.springer.com/article/10.1...
- I'm back from the dead to announce a paper that was published a couple of days ago and that I worked on. We're all very proud of this one. We elaborate on Varela’s neurophenomenology, proposing Bayesian mechanics as a generative passage between phenomenology and neurobiology.
- 🚨 New article in #NCONSC! Deep computational neurophenomenology: a methodological framework for investigating the how of experience academic.oup.com/nc/article/2... A Bayesian computational framework to bridge first-person experience and brain activity @antoinelutz.bsky.social @hohwy.bsky.social
- More specifically, we aim to provide a principled methodology for the scientific study of consciousness that, following phenomenological philosophy, focuses not on the contents of experience (i.e., what is experienced) but on its structures (i.e., how it is experienced).
- The idea is to aim at a disciplined circulation between first and third-person perspectives, using the formalism of deep parametric active inference and the dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics as a generative passage.
- It was great to work on this project led by Lars Sandved-Smith, and alongside @hohwy.bsky.social, @jdkiverstein.bsky.social, and @antoinelutz.bsky.social.
- Reposted by Juan Diego BogotáOut now! Mind as Metaphor (OUP, 2023) t.co/eBlYtDd5lY
- I love you Britain, but after having a proper taste of Finnish trains over the last four months I don’t think I want to travel in one of your trains ever again.
- Reposted by Juan Diego BogotáEl listado está lejos de ser completo. Por favor hagan sugerencias para completarlo. No se sientan incómodos al sugerir su propio nombre, y disculpas de antemano por la omisión. Gracias! go.bsky.app/4XmN14ihttps...at://did:plc:3hei5fquot7gdi6td6k6dw23/app.bsky.graph.starterpack/3ldj2q2ho422t
- Reposted by Juan Diego BogotáSpanglish es my language del thought.
- Two reviews, one talk, one abstract, one revision, and my birthday on a single week. Never again.
- I find it hilarious that Springer allowed two books in the same series to have essentially the same title.
- What makes it a bit funnier is that my PhD thesis was also titled 'Life and Mind'. But in my defense, that wasn't the title I wanted. For bureaucratic reasons, I had to submit a 'preliminary title' in a rush for the university to contact potential examiners, and then they didn't let me change it :(
- New paper: I explore the possibility of integrating enactivism and the Free Energy Principle to address life and mind. I examine some of the arguments in favour and against their integration, and claim that something close to it is possible. link.springer.com/chapter/10.1... #philosophy #philsky
- Drawing from the latest literature, I show that even if the FEP by itself doesn't say much about life or mind specifically, it can be used to model the sense-making dynamics of organisms as described by the enactivists. The point is not to conflate operational, cognitive, and statistical boundaries.
- There is also a nice discussion about why I think that sense-making does not fall into the 'hard problem of content' that radical enactivists talk about. Cognition requires a non-representational form of content, and sense-making is just that.
- Here is an open-access, pre-print version of the paper: www.researchgate.net/publication/... But if anybody wants the pdf of the published version, reach out to me and I'll send it over.
- It’s so heartbreaking when you’re reading a manuscript you are reviewing that at first shows a lot of promise, but then starts falling apart when the authors are developing their own proposal
- Reposted by Juan Diego Bogotá📣Calling all enactivists and critics! Russell Meyer, Marilyn Stendera and myself are guest editing a special issue for Adaptive Behaviour called "Prospects for the science of Enaction" and are looking for contributions! You can read more about our call here: listserv.liv.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa?A...
- I tend to tell myself that I am first and foremost a phenomenologist and that is all I want to write about, but then I go on to write 3000 words about the distinction between causal and constitutive scientific explanations. Oh well
- Recently, an alleged anthropomorphism at the core of enactivism has been discussed given the reliance on phenomenology when examining life and mind. In a new paper, I address the role that phenomenology can play concerning biology within enactivism. link.springer.com/article/10.1...
- More specifically, I believe that the charge of anthropomorphism within the enactive framework is the result of a lack of clarity concerning the role that phenomenology may play when discussing basic life and cognition.
- In my paper, I distinguish two characterisations of sense-making (the enactive concept for cognition) that, thus far, haven't been disentangled in the enactive literature: an operational one (adaptive behaviour, agency) and a phenomenological one (subjective perspective).
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View full threadIn a nutshell, phenomenologically, organisms are disclosed as such from the empathic perspective of the biologist. Phenomenology can analyse this empathic constitution providing an explanatory basis for a non-objectivist biology and for a phenomenological conception of cognition
- Reposted by Juan Diego BogotáNew preprint: “Deep computational neurophenomenology: A methodological framework for investigating the how of experience” Exciting collaboration with Lars Sandved Smith, @antoinelutz.bsky.social, Julian Kiverstein, @jdbogotaj.bsky.social osf.io/preprints/os...