[This post could not be retrieved]
I don't think 6 months is a big win for anyone (unless the foundational differences over an agenda for talks can be resolved) But I do agree that we need a fundamental rethinking of deterrence and arms control. What's the stability and security problem we want to solve with the arms control process?
That's the question to investigate.
I would bar the use of the word "deterrence," which seems to break people's brains.
It's a shame because there's a legitimate and growing need for a sort of guardrail / boundary which feels a lot like deterrence in practice.
But the admin largely can't read beyond "dominance" and from there we get a complete unwillingness to work with inherent and necessary vulnerabilities
Who are you trying to deter? What are you trying to deter them from doing? What tools do you have to implement this "strategy" of deterrence? How can cooperation and restraint (i.e. arms control) help manage that deterrence process and reduce the risks of escalation to nuclear use? That's my agenda.
YES!
How I define/describe the issue: Arms control is a process that nations have used to manage their nuclear competition, demonstrate restraint, and reduce the risk of nuclear war (or escalation to nuclear war) even if it doesn't produce legally binding treaties that reduce nuclear weapons.
This is potentially much more fruitful than the deterrence/ upload approach, which ignores the changes in the world since the 1960s.
Arms control has brought about some of those changes.
This is exactly what has been driving me crazy over the last few months! An AC-rooted approach engages directly with the risks and even finds ways to make deterrence more effective; the upload approach requires blinders on risk management and a pivot to zero-sum dynamics.
Feb 5, 2026 15:08I start with Schelling; combine a bunch of his quotes and you get "arms control is tool of national security policy" and works WITH military planning, not in opposition to it. Then I switch over to Michael Krepon's point that arms control takes the rough edges of deterrence. This is not new for me.
I don't think 6 months is a big win for anyone (unless the foundational differences over an agenda for talks can be resolved) But I do agree that we need a fundamental rethinking of deterrence and arms control. What's the stability and security problem we want to solve with the arms control process?
